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attempts to attract the business of national credit card
issuing banks.
Justice Arabian regarded the majority's
expansive definition of interest, based on the need to
protect national banks' "most favored lending" status, as
seriously flawed. He asserted that such an expansive
definition failed on the grounds that it simply was not
supported by the language of the statute or Congressional record. The statute, in using the word "interest,"
was never unaccompanied by the word "rate"; he found
it highly unlikely for Congress, in enacting the legislation, to have had any other definition in its mind other
than the narrowly, popularly understood definition cited
to by the majority - a sum linked to the lending of
money, calculated at a rate or percentage of the loan
over time. Further, Congressional debate centered on
"interest rates," and did not consider any notions of the
expansive definition embraced by the majority.
Justice Arabian also disputed the majority's
determination that the purpose of the National Bank Act
was to provide "favored lending" status to national
banks. As the Act was passed during the middle of the
Civil War, Justice Arabian found that the purpose of the
Act was the financing of the conflict. Section 85 was
provided, not to protect national banks from local efforts
to destroy them, but to induce state banks to change their
charters over to federal charters, and protect the future

of banking in the United States.
Further, Justice Arabian pointed out that at the
time of passage of the National Bank Act in 1864, and at
the time of the Marquette decision, interstate banking as
it persists today simply was not in existence. It was
untenable to conclude from the Act and the above case
that non-interest credit terms such as late payment
penalties were impliedly included within the definition
of interest. It was not logical to hold that Congress
should include late payment fees in its definition of
interest when such fees were as of yet non-existent.

Late payment fees are penalties, not interest
Justice George also dissented, and took
exception to the majority reading into the word "interest" any definition other than its common and properly
understood definition, believing such fees to be properly
viewed as either penalties or liquidated damages.
Nothing in the statute or legislative history suggested
that Congress meant to include within the definition of
"interest" such payments, and indeed, several leading
Supreme Court cases at the time of enactment made it
clear that such late payment charges would not be
considered interest for the purpose of ruling on usury
cases.

USDA regulations eclipse Kansas farmer's state
claims
by Russ Collins
Robert Murphy purchased vaccinations for his
cows that ultimately failed. However, in Murphy v.
Smithkline Beecham Animal Health Group, 898
F.Supp. 811 (D. Kan. 1995), the Kansas District Court
prevented Murphy from suing the vaccine's manufacturer. The Kansas court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion on the ground that Congress
granted the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA") ultimate authority to regulate the safety,
efficacy, potency, and purity of veterinary biological
products.
In late 1993, Murphy began injecting the cows
from his cattle feeding business with BoviShield 4 and
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vaccines manufactured by

Smithkline Beecham Animal Health Group
("Smithkline"). Although Murphy administered the
injections until early 1994, the vaccines failed to prevent
the cows from developing, and in some cases caused the
cows to develop, debilitating or fatal infections and
diseases.
Murphy sued Smithkline alleging breach of
implied warranty, false advertising, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, and failure to warn of dangers
associated with use of the vaccine. In response,
Smithkline filed a motion for summary judgment and
argued federal USDA regulations, specifically the VirusVolume 8, number 2

Serum-Toxin Act ("VSTA"), 21
U.S.C. §§ 151-159, preempted
Murphy's state law claims.
In deciding Smithkline's
motion, the Kansas District Court
applied a three-prong analysis to
detect whether USDA regulations
prevented Murphy's state claims.
Starting with the premise that
federal agencies may preempt state
law when the agency acts within the
limits of the power Congress
granted to it, the district court
examined three issues: 1) whether
Congress authorized the USDA to
preempt state law; 2) if so, whether
the federal regulation
preempted state law; and
M u
3) if the federal regulations precede state
Co
common law, whether
the regulations preempt
sol
Murphy's specific state
law claims.

Congress granted
the USDA power to
preempt
To prevent and
eliminate burdens on

preempt state tort laws. To support
his contention, Murphy argued that
Executive Order No. 12,612 limits
the preemptive power of executive
agencies to circumstances where
regulations expressly authorize, or
compelling evidence supports the
conclusion that Congress intended to
grant such power.
However, the court rejected
this argument, reasoning that the
Executive Order only applies as a
guideline for executive agencies and
not a nullification of preemption
power. The court further found that
Supreme Court precedent holds that
statutory express
authorizations are not
necessary for federal
agencies to preempt
state law. Based on
this analysis, the
court held that

rphy conceded that
igress gave the APHI,
ae power to prevent s tate
clai iMs, but he maintaine
J that
the VSTA lacked a specif ic
provision allowing it to
preempt state tort laws.

interstate commerce,
Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 154,
which grants the Secretary of
Agriculture the power to establish
rules and regulations necessary to
police the sale of serum, toxins, or
similar products used for treating
domestic animals. Subsequently, the
USDA delegated its power to the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service ("APHIS") to execute and
enforce regulations like the VSTA.
The first question explored the
preemptive power of such agency
regulations over state law.

1995-1996

In answering the first prong
of the inquiry, the Kansas court first
looked to an analogous case that
allowed federal regulations to
preempt state law. In City of New
York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988), the
United States Supreme Court held
that since Congress gave the Federal
Communications Commission
("FCC") the authority to establish
rules to enforce communications
laws, the FCC has the power to
preempt state regulations of television signals. The Kansas court noted
the language granting power to the
USDA here mirrors that of the

FCC's. The Kansas court also
acknowledged that the only case to
examine the VSTA, Lynnbrook
Farms v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1100 (II1. 1995),
supports the comparison of the
USDA's regulatory power to that of
the FCC and its preemption of state
law.
Murphy conceded that
Congress gave the APHIS some
power to prevent state claims, but he
maintained that the VSTA lacked a
specific provision allowing it to

Congress authorized
the USDA regulations
to preempt state law.

The USDA acted
to preempt
Kansas law

The court next
turned to the second step of its
analysis: whether APHIS acted
affirmatively to preempt state law.
The court looked to the agency's
own interpretation of the VSTA in 9
C.F.R. § 102 to determine whether
the APHIS intended to preempt state
law. The agency maintained that the
legislative history and purpose of the
VSTA show the act was established
to occupy the field of regulation by
imposing uniform national standards
in the distribution of veterinary
biological products. The purpose of
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such regulation was ultimately to
limit burdens on interstate commerce. The act prevented states from
adding requirements of their own
that implicated the "safety, efficacy,
potency or purity" of veterinary
biological products. This limitation
included labeling requirements but
did not include policies that address
unique local disease conditions.
Pointing out that the
language of VSTA itself limits its
preemptive powers, Murphy argued
that the court's interpretation of
VSTA was limited to affirmative
state legislative regulations and did
not apply to the basic, common law
remedies he sought in his suit
against Smithkline. Murphy also
maintained that the APHIS' interpretation of VSTA merely set minimum
standards; he argued that tort
remedies remained viable.
The court rejected these
arguments primarily based on
precedent established in the analogous case of Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
Cipollone involved a challenge to
the regulatory power of the Federal
Cigarette and Advertising Act
("Cigarette Act"), which contained
language akin to that in the VSTA.
In that case, the United States
Supreme Court rejected arguments
similar to those offered by Murphy
and held that the language of the
Cigarette Act preempted the
plaintiff's state claim regarding the
failure to warn consumers. Murphy
argued that while the Cipollone
court disallowed the suit based on
the defendant's failure to warn, it
permitted several of the plaintiff's
tort claims.
Murphy did not persuade
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the Kansas court to follow Cipollone
and hold that his tort claims should
not be preempted. Instead, it
distinguished that case by finding
that the language of the Cigarette
Act was specific and limited its
preemptive scope to advertising
regulations. In contrast, the language
of the VSTA is quite broad, preempting all "state requirements
'regarding the safety, efficacy,
potency or purity' as well as the
labeling of animal vaccines." In
response to Murphy's argument that
VSTA merely set the minimum
requirements, the court pointed to
the express language of APHIS,
which explicitly states that "[s]tates
are not free to impose requirements
which are different from, or in
addition to, those imposed by
USDA." This language is identical
to that in Cipollone and other cases
that preempted state common law
actions.
The Kansas court concluded that the APHIS interpretation
was persuasive because the agency's
interpretation of the VSTA was not
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." The court
reasoned that since Congress
granted the USDA power to
establish rules governing animal
veterinary products, the APHIS
decision to preempt state law did not
contradict the language of the
VSTA. To support this conclusion,
the court repeated that Congress
expressed its purpose to control
interstate commerce by imposing
regulations for veterinary biological
products applicable in all fifty states.
Accordingly, the court held that the
language of the VSTA supports
federal preemption of state require-

ments that are "different from, or in
addition to, those imposed by
USDA."

USDA regulations preempt
Murphy's specific claims
Finally, the court examined
the individual claims brought by
Murphy to decide whether those
claims or duties under Kansas law
impose requirements in addition to
those enforced by the USDA and
therefore are preempted by the
VSTA. The court compared each
claim against the standard established by the APHIS interpretation
of the VSTA: whether common law
duties constitute requirements that
are "different from, or in addition to,
those imposed by the USDA
regarding the safety, efficacy,
potency or purity of a (veterinary
biological) product."
The court held that
Murphy's claims of breach of
implied warranty, false advertising,
misrepresentation, and negligence
would all implicate the safety,
efficacy, potency or purity of the
product if enforced. Further, the
court held that enforcing Murphy's
claim that Smithkline failed to
provide adequate warnings would
impose an additional labeling
requirement, which VSTA does not
permit.
Since USDA regulations
preempted all of Murphy's claims
promulgated under the VSTA, the
farmer whose cattle were destroyed
from the allegedly defective vaccine
was left without a cause of action
against the manufacturer of the
vaccine.
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California court invalidates liquidated damages
provision in credit card agreement
by David Weissman
In Hitz v. FirstInterstateBank, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), the California Court of
Appeal held that Civil Code section 1671, subdivision
(d) ("§ 1671(d)"), invalidates the liquidated damages
clause in a credit card agreement when the amount of
those damages does not represent a "reasonable endeavor" to estimate potential loss resulting from a
breach of the agreement. However, the court also held
that the credit card-issuing bank is entitled to its actual
damages resulting from the breach based on the interest
rate established in the credit card agreement.

Class action plaintiffs awarded nearly $14
million at trial
This suit was initiated by credit card customers
of First Interstate Bank (the "Bank") who breached their
credit card agreements by failing to make timely
minimum monthly payments or by exceeding their credit
limits. The trial court certified these plaintiffs as a class,
consisting of the Bank's cardholders who were assessed
late or overlimit fees after February 10, 1983. The
plaintiffs argued at trial that the Bank's fees were void
under § 1671 (d) as invalid liquidated damages. After a
bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
awarding the class a judgment of $13,971,830.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal
agreed with the trial court's determination that § 1671(d)
invalidated the liquidated damages in the form of late
and overlimit fees, which were imposed by the Bank.
However, the court modified the judgment to reflect the
Bank's actual damages resulting from the cardholders'
breach of the credit card agreements. The court held that
these damages consisted of the interest on the plaintiffs'
late and overlimit balances assessed at the contract
(credit card agreement) rate.

Court of appeal finds error in computation
of defendant's actual damages
The court first addressed the issue of the
1995-1996

Bank's actual damages. The trial court had calculated
these damages by looking at the Bank's cost of borrowing the funds to pay the cardholders' late and overlimit
balances. The trial court based this cost on the average
federal funds interest rate, which is the rate that the
Bank had to pay to obtain the money from the reserves
of other banks in order to cover the costs incurred from
the plaintiffs' breaches. Because the Bank had charged
the cardholders the rate of interest established by the
credit card agreement, a higher rate than the federal
funds interest rate, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs
the difference between these two amounts. In other
words, the trial court returned to the plaintiffs the
amount the Bank had collected from them above what it
considered the Bank's actual damages to be.
The court of appeal, however, cited several
reasons why this calculation of the Bank's actual
damages was in error. First of all, the court looked to
statutory language and precedent for the proposition that
interest is to be charged at the rate agreed upon in a
contract after a breach of that contract. Civil Code
section 3298, subsection (a), "specifically provides for
interest to continue at the rate stipulated to by the
contract," according to the court. Also, the California
Supreme Court case of Garrett v. Coast & Southern Fed.
Sav.& Loan Assn., 511 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1973), discussed
"the fixed nature of damages resulting because of the
wrongful withholding of money."
The court of appeal pointed out the possible
anomalous results of the trial court's application of the
federal funds interest rate to the late and overlimit
balances, in that "delinquent cardholders would pay less
on their delinquent balances than nondelinquent
cardholders would pay on their nondelinquent balances."
The court further noted that such a rule could then be
applied to commercial loans in general, creating
confusion and uncertainty for borrowers and lenders
alike.
The trial court's second error, according to the
court of appeal, was accepting the plaintiffs' theory that
their breach of the credit card agreement conferred a
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